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Key points 
On January 20th, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran had been implementing its 
commitments as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed with the so-called ‘E3+3’ in Geneva (also 
known as P5+1) on 24 November 2013. The forging of this interim deal, the successful start to its 
implementation and the temporary sanctions relief represent resounding success for international diplomacy 
but they should not be allowed to conceal the underlying issues. Reaching agreement on the JPA was 
achieved at the cost of clarity over what is to follow and it was decided to eschew a structured agreement in 
favour of a two-step process. The stated aim of the negotiating parties remains that of starting the 
implementation of a comprehensive solution by November 2014. If agreement is not reached on a 
comprehensive solution by the expiry of the JPA by July 20th, the action plan can be renewed by mutual 
consent. The latter might well be the likeliest outcome of the forthcoming negotiations. Apart from the large 
gap between the E3+3 and Iranian positions on the substance of a final deal, several domestic policy 
constraints will likely define the parameters of what is achievable in the future.  
This CEPS Policy Brief argues that the best hope for success lies in continued engagement and consistent 
incremental progress in the negotiations, with structured concessions on both sides. This should occur, 
however, not in a two- but a three-step framework based on lengthening Iran’s ‘breakout’ period while re-
engaging with the country both politically and economically. The EU is in a unique position to lead this 
process. Having greater flexibility than either the US or Iran, its main tasks will be that of maintaining the 
negotiating momentum and broadening dialogue with Iran.  
Recommendations 
 The High Representative, supported by the European External Action Service and the EU member states, 
must maintain momentum in the negotiating process throughout the EU’s institutional transition in 
2014, working with the US and Iran to overcome their domestic constraints, while keeping Russia on 
board. 
 The EU must restate its commitment to enforcing the remaining sanctions, dissuade other P5+1 partners 
from imposing new sanctions during the timeframe of the JPA, be ready to deliver timely sanctions relief 
if negotiations progress satisfactorily and also be prepared to re-impose its own sanctions if negotiations 
collapse. 
 EU institutions should deepen channels of communication with Iran on issues of regional security as 
well as human rights. The High Representative’s planned visit in March will be an important follow-up 
to the delegation sent by the European Parliament in December. 
 EU member states can contribute to building trust with Iran by re-engaging diplomatically, offering 
cooperation in terms of regional dialogue and promising concrete support for the development of 
nuclear energy for civilian purposes. Closer commercial links can also be beneficial in normalising 
relations, but member states must make it clear, to both Iran and their own citizens and companies, that 
no trade in sanctioned goods and services will take place as long as sanctions remain in force. 
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1. Introduction 
On January 20th, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iran had 
been implementing its commitments as part of 
the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed by the 
E3+3 in Geneva on November 24th of last year.1 
In particular, the Agency confirmed that Iran 
had not installed new centrifuges, that it had 
stopped enriching uranium above 5%, that it 
had disabled connections between cascades 
being used to enrich up to 20%, and that it had 
begun the process of diluting half of its stockpile 
of 20%, while the other half is to be converted to 
oxide over the next six months.2 Over the next 
six months, the IAEA will continue to monitor 
Iranian enrichment, and activities at Arak, 
Fordow and Natanz. Immediately following the 
IAEA announcement, the US and EU suspended 
some of the sanctions currently imposed on 
Iran. Sanctions relief, quantified at $7 billion, 
comprises both the suspension of some 
sanctions and the repatriation of $4.2 billion of 
oil revenues in tranches. 
This is a promising start to the six-month period 
over which the JPA is to be implemented: by 
effectively freezing the Iranian programme for 
six months, breathing space is created for 
negotiations to forge ahead. The sealing of the 
deal in November, and the successful start to its 
implementation represent resounding successes 
for international diplomacy, they but should not 
be allowed to conceal the underlying issues. 
Reaching agreement on the JPA was achieved at 
the cost of clarity over what is to follow, and it 
was decided to eschew a structured agreement 
in favour of a two-step process. In order to 
                                                     
1 The E3+3 are composed of Germany, France, the UK, plus 
China, Russia and the US. Negotiations within this format 
are conducted under the auspices of the EU. The format is 
better known in international circles as the ‘P5+1’, referring 
to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, 
plus Germany, but this notion denies the crucial role that 
the EU plays in the process. In this Policy Brief, however, 
the two concepts will be used interchangeably, 
2  Statement by Yukiya Amano, Director General of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, 20 January 2014 
(www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2014/prn20140
2.html). 
secure agreement over the JPA, negotiators 
skipped over a series of thorny issues that will 
have to be looked at in the next phase of talks, 
starting on February 18th in Vienna. This paper 
argues that the current situation presents a 
series of hurdles that the EU is well-positioned 
to overcome.  
2. An imperfect deal  
The JPA freezes many elements of the Iranian 
nuclear programme, lengthening the ‘breakout’ 
time needed for Iran to make a nuclear device. 
However, some commentators have pointed out 
that it does not do enough; i.e. that the deal 
allows Iran to maintain all its centrifuges and 
current infrastructure, to retain its stockpile of 
low enriched uranium and to continue research 
and development in advanced centrifuge 
models. 3  Because of these shortcomings, it is 
argued that Iran actually retains the ability to 
break out within a period of 2 to 3 months.4 It 
would have been unrealistic, however, to expect 
the two sides to agree on a JPA that would 
already begin the process of rolling back the 
Iranian nuclear programme. 
Nevertheless, these issues will have to be 
addressed in the next phase of negotiations: any 
deal that allows Iran to remain a nuclear 
threshold state will not be acceptable to the US 
Congress or the American public. This clear-cut 
requirement clashes with comments made by 
                                                     
3  Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS Director for Non-Proliferation, 
Testimony to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee, 28 January 2014 (www.parliamentlive.tv/ 
Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=14747&player=silverlight).  
4 Olli Heinonen (Senior Fellow Belfer Center for Science 
and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government at Harvard University) argued for a breakout 
period of ‘over three months’ in a hearing in front of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, 28 January 2014 
(http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20140128/10
1679/HHRG-113-FA13-Wstate-HeinonenO-20140128.pdf). 
David Albright (Founder and President of the Institute for 
Science and International Security) argued that Iran’s 
breakout time has been lengthened to “1.9 to 2.2 months” 
in a hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
28 January 2014 (http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/ 
FA13/20140128/101679/HHRG-113-FA13-Wstate-
AlbrightD-20140128.pdf). 
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Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign 
Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif, suggesting 
that they have little intention of significantly 
rolling back their existing nuclear 
infrastructure.5 
Apart from the large gap between the American 
and Iranian positions, there are also a set of 
domestic policy constraints that will define the 
parameters of what is achievable in the future. 
The easing of the sanctions regime may well 
come to threaten cohesion amongst the E3, 
while also potentially leading to a split between 
the EU and the US. Indeed, there are some 
worrying signs that the two may already be 
drifting apart, with the US being much more 
overt than the Europeans in its enforcement of 
the remaining sanctions. The stated aim of the 
negotiating parties remains that of starting the 
implementation of a comprehensive solution by 
November 2014. Should it prove impossible to 
reach agreement on a comprehensive solution 
by the expiry of the JPA by July 20th, the JPA is 
‘renewable by mutual consent’.6 
The issues outlined above suggest that this 
might well be the likeliest outcome of the 
forthcoming negotiations. Yet, the final aim 
should not be lost sight of: achieving a 
comprehensive solution remains the most 
practicable route of international action. The 
best hope for success lies in continued 
engagement and consistent incremental 
progress in the negotiations, with structured 
concessions on both sides.  
3. Broad international disagreements 
Two very different conceptions of what a final 
deal should look like lie at the heart of the 
difficulties in negotiating a comprehensive deal. 
A deal acceptable to the EU and the US would 
                                                     
5 Hassan Rouhani, Speech at World Economic Forum, 23 
January 2014 (http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/ 
world/meast/rouhani-calls-sanctions-illegal/). See also 
CNN Interview with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad 
Javad Zarif, 23 January 2014 (http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2014/01/22/politics/iran-us-nuclear/).  
6 Joint Plan of Action (http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/ 
docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf). 
ensure that Iran was no longer a nuclear 
‘threshold state’, and it would significantly roll 
back the Iranian nuclear programme in terms of 
numbers of centrifuges and enrichment 
locations and restrict enrichment above 5%. In 
particular a comprehensive agreement 
acceptable to the US would shut down the 
enrichment at the underground facility at 
Fordow and neutralise the heavy-water reactor 
at Arak. 7  Analysts also estimate that the US 
would aim to reduce the number of centrifuges 
from almost 20,000 to 2-3,000, and commit Iran 
to forgoing all enrichment above 5%.8 
In the US, many hawks would object to such a 
deal, aiming at a complete halt to Iranian 
enrichment. Although Europeans support the 
American stance, the EU in its official position is 
more reserved about its own vision of a 
comprehensive agreement: 
The objective of the EU remains to achieve a 
comprehensive, negotiated, long-term 
settlement, which would build international 
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature 
of the Iranian nuclear programme, while 
respecting Iran’s legitimate right to the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity 
with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and fully 
taking into account UN Security Council and 
IAEA Board of Governors resolutions.9 
Russia and China also remain committed to a 
solution that places the Iranian nuclear 
programme on a firmly civilian footing. 
However, unlike the EU and US, both countries 
                                                     
7 See Written Statement by Wendy Sherman, US Under-
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, “Iran Policy and 
Negotiations Update”, 4 February 2014 (www.uspolicy.be/ 
headline/state%E2%80%99s-sherman-negotiations-
iran?utm_source=Foreign+Policy+Newsletter&utm_campa
ign=01a39aa25a-Foreign_Policy_Newsletter_of_April_29_ 
2011&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4350c93b63-
01a39aa25a-411259305). 
8 See Mark Fitzpatrick, “Diplomacy over Iran nuclear deal 
lives on”, IISS Politics and Strategy Blog, 20 January 2014 
(www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsection
s/2014-d2de/january-1f44/diplomacy-over-iran-8593). 
9  EEAS Factsheet “The European Union and Iran” 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131219_04
_en.pdf). 
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have also maintained extensive trading links 
with Iran, in particular in the energy sector, and 
have opposed unilateral sanctions. The interplay 
of considerations on trade and security will 
increasingly shape their attitudes in the next 
phase of negotiations, and might lead to 
increasing differences within the E3+3.  
Conversely, the idea of rolling back the 
programme does not seem to appeal to many 
members of Iran’s ruling establishment, who are 
unwilling to give up what they are proud to 
have achieved. Following the January 20th start 
to the implementation of the JPA, Iranian 
leaders issued statements highlighting the 
distance between the negotiating positions, with 
Rouhani stating that “not under any 
circumstances” would Iran destroy any of its 
existing centrifuges, and that the Arak reactor is 
necessary for the production of medical 
isotopes. 10  However, there have also been 
encouraging signs, with Iranian leaders 
repeatedly stating their willingness to work 
towards a comprehensive deal, and with the 
head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, 
Ali Akbar Salehi, stating that Iran is prepared to 
carry out modifications to the Arak reactor to 
help allay existing fears concerning plutonium 
production. 11  Finding common ground 
necessitates a structured framework based on a 
series of confidence-building phases, which 
must include IAEA verification concerning the 
past and present possible military dimensions of 
the programme. A first step in this regard was 
taken on February 9th, with Iran agreeing to 
provide the Agency with information on 
detonators.12 
                                                     
10  CNN, 23 January 2014 (http://edition.cnn.com/2014/ 
01/23/world/meast/rouhani-calls-sanctions-illegal/). 
11  “Iran says may modify Arak reactor to allay nuclear 
concerns”, 6 February 2014 (www.reuters.com/article/ 
2014/02/06/us-iran-nuclear-arak-idUSBREA150KA 
20140206?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews). 
12 IAEA Press Release, “IAEA and Iran Conclude Talks in 
Connection with Implementation of Framework of 
Cooperation”, 9 February 2014 (www.iaea.org/ 
newscenter/news/2014/iaea_iran090214.html). 
4. Domestic negotiating constraints  
The international disagreements over the 
technical elements of the nuclear programme are 
compounded by domestic constraints in the US, 
in Iran and within Europe itself. Trust between 
international actors can be built, but it is harder 
to influence the underlying mentalities 
prevalent in policy-making milieus and public 
opinion. The boundaries of any future deal are 
likely to be shaped by domestic concerns as 
much as by international negotiations.  
Within the US many commentators and policy-
makers are opposed to any deal that would 
leave Iran with an indigenous enrichment 
capacity, and a deal that seems to be too lenient 
towards Iran is likely to be fiercely opposed. A 
lack of progress in the negotiations before the 
JPA expires in July would reinforce perceptions 
that Iran is stalling, provoking US lawmakers to 
introduce further sanctions. The Menendez–
Kirk bill (S. 1881 – ‘Nuclear Weapon Free Iran 
Act of 2013’) has stalled after Obama made clear 
his intention to oppose it, in the knowledge that 
the Iranians would perceive it as violating the 
current agreement.13 The President has gained 
breathing space, with enough lawmakers 
willing to give diplomacy a chance, but if 
negotiations were to stall it is possible that the 
bill will regain momentum. 
The passing of the bill would not only step up 
sanctions, but also prevent their removal until a 
set of tough conditions had been met. It would 
commit the President to certify that any final 
deal would involve the dismantling of Iran’s 
“illicit nuclear infrastructure, including 
enrichment and reprocessing”. 14  By making it 
extremely difficult to deliver its side of the 
bargain, the passing of the bill could have the 
effect of severely undermining the negotiating 
position of the US. The attitude of Congress will 
also be crucial if negotiations were to proceed 
successfully: in fact, congressional approval is 
                                                     
13  State of the Union Speech, 28 January 2014 
(http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2014/01/politics/sot
u-speech-transcript/index.html). 
14 Library of Congress Bill Summary and Status, Bill S 1881 
(http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d113:s.1881). 
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needed to rescind many of the sanctions 
currently imposed on Iran. For the time being, 
the President can provide a degree of sanctions 
relief by suspending those sanctions issued by 
Executive Order, but if broader concessions are 
required, then he would be unable to provide 
them on his own. The removal of sanctions 
imposed on Iran by means of Congressional 
Acts requires the passage of new legislation, 
which might prove to be significantly more 
difficult to deliver after the mid-term elections 
in November 2014.  
On the Iranian side, there is more support than 
ever before in the domestic political arena for a 
negotiated settlement, and there has never been 
a time since the revolution when talks in Tehran 
about a potential arrangement with the US have 
been so open. Iran’s catastrophic economic 
situation is seen by many observers as the 
Rouhani government’s central motive to end the 
nuclear standoff – and the sanctions against Iran 
– as quickly as possible. 
However, as observed by Walter Posch, an 
Iranian specialist at the Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik (SWP) in Berlin, Iran’s goal in the 
nuclear negotiations is not just an easing of 
sanctions. Its constructive attitude is also a 
result of the domestic political moderation and 
the new consensus within the security elite. The 
changing regional dynamics and the 
strengthening of Al-Qaeda also play an 
important role.15 
Whatever the reasons, there are technical and 
political obstacles to further progress in the 
solution of the nuclear file. Firstly, agreeing to 
the JPA did not require a commitment to rolling 
back the programme in terms of infrastructure, 
meaning that the agreement was acceptable to 
broad sections of the elite, including those who 
would like Iran to retain the option of producing 
a nuclear device. Future deals will require steps 
that will drive Iran further away from this 
capability, and are therefore likely to encounter 
greater resistance. Secondly, the complex and 
                                                     
15  See W. Posch, “Iran’s Interests in the Nuclear 
Negotiations”, Fair Observer, 6 December 2013. 
multi-layered nature of the Iranian political 
system, with several centres of power, means 
that Rouhani’s own ability to deliver in the 
negotiations is not yet clear. His approach to 
date has enjoyed backing at the highest level, 
but there is simmering opposition. 
If negotiations were to stall or become too 
confrontational, it is possible that hardliners 
might gain leverage, making a final deal 
increasingly difficult to achieve. Finally, 
Rouhani’s support is at least partly based on his 
ability to deliver relief from the severe economic 
pressures created by the sanctions: so far he and 
foreign minister Zarif seem to have been 
successful in this respect and have therefore 
managed to retain room for manoeuvre, but if 
they fail to secure new concessions it is possible 
that the President’s own internal position will be 
weakened. In any case, a deal that does not 
broadly satisfy the regime is not feasible, and at 
a later stage the Iranian Parliament will also 
have to become involved to approve the IAEA 
Additional Protocol. Moreover, both public 
opinion and civil society have roles to play, and 
these need not be negative ones: indeed by 
renewing public diplomacy efforts, the P5+1 
could well strengthen the Iranian moderates.  
Compared to the other actors, the European 
Union appears relatively flexible, due to a 
combination of three different factors. Firstly, it 
can be argued that there are relatively limited 
constraints placed by European publics on 
reaching a final deal with Iran: the threat from 
Iran is seen as relatively remote, and does not 
carry the same intensity as it does in the US. 
Secondly, in contrast with the US, the 
mechanism for removing EU sanctions is 
relatively straightforward: they can be 
suspended or rescinded by a unanimous 
decision on the part of the Council of 
Ministers.16 Finally, Europe has already been re-
engaging in dialogue with Iran, especially on a 
bilateral level. Italy was amongst the first, with a 
visit by Foreign Minister Emma Bonino in 
                                                     
16  See “Factsheet on EU restrictive measures” 
(www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press
data/EN/foraff/135804.pdf). 
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December 2013, followed by parliamentary 
delegations from the UK and Germany and 
Sweden’s Foreign Minister Carl Bildt in early 
February. The combination of these three factors 
means that the European Union is ideally placed 
to provide further sanctions relief if required to 
do so, enabling negotiations to continue where 
they might otherwise have stalled or failed. 
However, in order to maintain credibility, the 
EU and its member states must strive to 
maintain cohesiveness. This is threatened both 
by untimely unilateral interventions from 
individual member states, and by the easing of 
sanctions. Unilateral interventions by member 
states, such as the break of negotiating protocol 
by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius 
during the November talks, risk undermining 
the united front presented by the E3: any 
differences should be resolved behind closed 
doors and not aired in public. 
The easing of sanctions stemming from the 
implementation of the JPA poses a threat 
despite the relatively limited scope of relief 
provided. Indeed, EU member states and 
European businesses seem to be scrambling to 
send official delegations to Iran, their eyes set on 
the resumption of deep economic links.17 These 
missions have the potential to cause tension 
with the US. A recent high-level French trade 
delegation of over 100 executives attracted 
comments from US Secretary of State John 
Kerry, who defined it as “not helpful”.18 
European efforts to re-engage with Iran 
diplomatically should not morph into an 
untimely race to secure a share of Iranian 
markets and resources. This would risk driving 
a wedge between member states and by so 
doing it would also undermine the EU’s 
negotiating position towards Iran in the P5+1.  
                                                     
17  “The Iran Gold Rush”, Wall Street Journal, 22 January 
2014 (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304302704579333111629746556). 
18  Report of phone call between Kerry and Fabius, 5 
February 2014 (www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/05/ 
us-iran-france-delegation-idUSBREA140FK20140205). 
5. An unravelling sanctions regime?  
Sanctions on Iran have been much 
misunderstood, partly because it is not easy to 
isolate both their quantitative impact on the 
Iranian economy and their effectiveness in 
compelling the Iranians to resume 
negotiations.19  Broadly speaking, however, the 
consolidation of a very severe set of EU and US 
sanctions from 2012 has played a role in the 
election of Rouhani as President on a platform 
of re-engagement with the international 
community. Whereas the first signs of an Iranian 
re-engagement on the nuclear file are raising 
hopes for a resolution of the long-standing 
dispute, talk of the abatement of the sanctions 
regime is premature. The Iranian regime should 
stay the course.  
In quantitative terms, the sanctions relief 
provided by the JPA removes only a small part 
of the overall burden on the Iranian economy. 
Iran has gained relief quantified at $7 billion, 
but sanctions on crude oil alone will result in a 
loss of $30 billion over the six-month timeframe 
of the JPA.20 Specifically, the P5+1 have agreed 
to halt efforts to reduce Iranian oil sales, 
“enabling Iran’s current customers to purchase 
their current average amounts of crude”, 
suspended sanctions on insurance for transport 
of such oil and allowed the repatriation of $4.2 
billion in revenue from oil sales currently held 
abroad. The EU and US have also suspended the 
prohibition on the import, purchase or transport 
of Iranian petrochemical products and on the 
provision of related services; as well as the 
prohibition on trade in gold and precious 
metals. 21  Additionally, the US has suspended 
sanctions on Iran’s auto industry.22 
                                                     
19  See S. Blockmans and S. Waizer, “E3+3 coercive 
diplomacy towards Iran: Do the economic sanctions add 
up?”, CEPS Policy Brief, 6 June 2013. 
20 “The Iran Deal”, The Economist, 30 November 2013.  
21 Joint Plan of Action (http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/ 
docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf). For suspension of EU 
sanctions see Council Regulation No. 2014/42/EU of 20 
January 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No. 267/2012 
concerning restrictive measures against Iran, OJEU 2014 L 
15/18 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:015:0018:0021:EN:PDF) and 
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On the whole, sanctions against Iran have not 
been significantly altered by the terms of the 
JPA: in particular Iranian oil sales are not 
supposed to increase during the timeframe of 
the agreement, and the US administration has 
made it clear that existing sanctions will 
continue to be strictly enforced. 23  A strong 
message was given on February 6th, when the 
Treasury announced actions against 18 
businesses and 14 individuals deemed to be in 
violation of sanctions.24 Moreover, the amount 
of direct revenue to be released, $4.2 billion, is to 
be made available in tranches, with the final 
instalment not released until the last day of the 
six-month period.  There are risks that the 
sanctions regime might be weakened, but these 
do not stem from the scope of relief currently 
envisaged, but rather from their non-
enforcement or from the ‘oil for goods’ deal 
allegedly being negotiated between Iran and 
Russia, which could potentially be worth up to 
$1.5 billion a month.25 Much also depends on the 
actions of actors such as China and India, 
neither of whom have significantly altered their 
trade relations with Iran.26  
                                                                                       
Council Decision 2014/21/CFSP of 20 January 2014 
amending Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning 
restrictive measures against Iran, OJEU 2014 L 15/22 
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:015:0022:0023:EN:PDF). 
22 “Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Temporary 
Sanctions Relief to Implement the Joint Plan of Action 
between the P5+1 and the Islamic Republic of Iran” 
(www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/ 
Documents/jpoa_faqs.pdf). 
23  US Treasury, US Department of State, “GUIDANCE 
RELATING TO THE PROVISION OF CERTAIN 
TEMPORARY SANCTIONS RELIEF IN ORDER TO 
IMPLEMENT THE JOINT PLAN OF ACTION REACHED 
ON NOVEMBER 24, 2013, BETWEEN THE P5+1 AND 
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN” 
(www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/ 
Documents/jpoa_guidance.pdf). 
24 US Treasury Press Release, “Treasury Targets Networks 
Linked to Iran”, 6 February 2014 (www.treasury.gov/ 
press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2287.aspx). 
25 “U.S. has concerns about Iran-Russia oil-for-goods swap 
reports”, 13 January 2014 (www.reuters.com/article/2014/ 
01/13/us-usa-iran-sanctions-russia-
idUSBREA0C1KQ20140113). 
26 See Blockmans and Waizer, op. cit. 
The E3 should resolve potential ambiguities in 
their attitude to sanctions. On one hand, official 
visits and trade delegations contribute to the 
creation of a positive political dialogue with 
Iran, while exploratory trade talks can provide 
the Iranians with positive incentives to reach a 
comprehensive deal. But trading delegations can 
also give the wrong impression, namely that 
Europe now considers Iran to be open for 
business, and therefore undermine the legal 
framework of remaining sanctions. 
Conditionality of the resumption of full trading 
links on the removal of sanctions should be 
made clear: the EU’s credibility is on the line.  
In their current arrangement, sanctions retain 
their importance as a key element of diplomatic 
negotiations, both as a bargaining chip and as a 
tool of diplomatic pressure. The EU should 
make it clear that additional easing should only 
take place as part of a structured process after 
further negotiating progress. Conversely, new 
sanctions are likely to be counterproductive, and 
may well reinforce the narrative of persecution, 
which has long been espoused by the Iranian 
regime, strengthening Iran’s resolve not to make 
humiliating concessions. Moreover, if they are 
perceived as unjust, they could also have the 
effect of splintering the unity of the international 
community. The imposition of new sanctions 
should only be considered if it becomes clear 
that Iran has no intention of negotiating a 
comprehensive settlement, in which case, they 
should be supported by the whole international 
community. 
6. Envisaging a framework  
The issues outlined above show the difficulties 
in pursuing negotiations, while also 
highlighting how any faltering of the 
negotiating process risks strengthening the 
position of those parties that do not want a deal, 
both in the US and Iran. There is also the risk 
that pressure to resume business with Iran may 
slowly but progressively weaken the united 
front within the EU and between Europe and 
the US. It is necessary to keep the momentum 
behind the talks steady and strong, to maintain 
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engagement and to aim for a series of small but 
incremental steps aimed at gradually building 
trust between the two sides.27 
The first of these steps should aim to completely 
freeze the nuclear programme, eliminating any 
risk or substantiated fear of a breakout, so that 
any attempt to do so could be detected in a 
timely manner. In exchange, Iran would obtain 
an easing of the sanctions equal in scope to that 
carried out under the JPA. A complete freeze 
would involve the halt of all construction work 
carried out at Arak and place severe limits on 
testing new centrifuge models. It would ramp 
up IAEA monitoring to ensure that Iran is 
complying with its obligations and that it is not 
enriching covertly. Reaching an agreement 
along these lines would do much to assuage fear 
that Iran is negotiating merely in order to gain 
time. It would mean that the deal could be 
renewed without fears of letting Iran creep 
closer to developing the bomb, while also 
providing a solid platform from which to 
negotiate further. It would have to be 
accompanied by significant steps in terms of 
political rapprochement and closer dialogue. 
The further facilitation of ‘humanitarian’ trade, 
especially in medicines, would be a key first 
step in the process.  
During the second, intermediate stage, Iran would 
resume the implementation of the IAEA 
Safeguards Agreement Additional Protocol and 
ratify it. At the same time, the IAEA would 
work to resolve outstanding issues concerning 
weaponisation of nuclear power, both past and 
present. During this phase the number of 
Iranian centrifuges should gradually be 
reduced, perhaps by not repairing or replacing 
broken ones. A ‘centrifuges for sanctions’ deal 
would be appropriate, but is unlikely to be 
acceptable to Iran or the US. Alternatively the 
centrifuges could be rendered inactive and 
                                                     
27 The analysis builds on the draft agreement hammered 
out by a Task Force on Iran convened by the Strategic 
Studies Network in 2013. See SSN, “What’s the Deal? 
Crafting an Agreement on Iran’s Nuclear Program” 
(http://strategicstudiesnetwork.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/07/2013-03-28-Iran-Nuclear-
Agreement.pdf). 
placed under IAEA supervision. EU sanctions 
and US Executive Order sanctions should be 
reduced gradually in a series of steps directly 
equivalent to the number of centrifuges 
rendered inactive and to the lessening of the 
uranium stockpile. In this phase detailed 
negotiations over the scope of the future nuclear 
programme can take place, with guarantees and 
aid being provided for Iran’s nuclear energy 
development. Issues concerning Arak could be 
solved by modifying the reactor there into a 
light-water reactor. In a ‘side dialogue’ the EU 
should aim to deepen relations with Iran, based 
on the normalisation of trade relations, technical 
assistance and the setting up of a regional 
security dialogue.   
The third phase would start once the IAEA has 
verified compliance with previous steps and 
certified that Iran has come clean on its nuclear 
programme. In this phase all remaining nuclear 
sanctions would be lifted, while Iran would be 
permitted to enrich within the needs of its 
nuclear energy programme. However, ongoing 
concerns about the Iranian government’s human 
rights record are likely to delay the removal of 
non-nuclear related sanctions adopted by the 
EU and other actors.  
7. Prescriptions for the EU  
The EU has a key role to play in the coming set 
of negotiations. Having greater flexibility than 
either the US or Iran, its main tasks will be to 
maintain the negotiating momentum and 
broaden dialogue with Iran.  
As far as the actual negotiating process is 
concerned, the task of EU institutions and 
member states is two-fold: they must maintain 
momentum and be prepared to deliver on 
sanctions. Maintaining the momentum behind 
the negotiations to enable the timely negotiation 
of follow-on agreements is crucial both in 
overcoming simmering domestic opposition 
within the US and Iran, and in retaining a 
united effort amongst the P5+1. Indeed, given 
that the Iranian nuclear programme is frozen 
and that further negotiations are going to entail 
its gradual rolling back, it is possible that it will 
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become harder to keep Russia and China on 
board. Given that the mandate of the current 
High Representative of the EU runs out on 30 
November 2014, the EEAS will have to keep in 
place a negotiating and support team that sees 
the transition to a new incumbent through. 
In terms of sanctions, the EU must restate its 
commitment to enforcing the remaining 
restrictive measures, attempt to persuade the US 
not to impose new sanctions during the 
timeframe of the JPA, be ready to deliver timely 
sanctions relief if negotiations progress 
satisfactorily, and also be prepared to re-impose 
its own sanctions if negotiations collapse.   
EU institutions should also aim to deepen 
channels of communication with Iran on issues 
of regional security as well as human rights 
within Iran. In this regard, Ashton’s planned 
visit in March will be an important follow-up to 
the delegation sent by the European Parliament 
in December.  
On a bilateral level, all EU member states can 
contribute to building trust with Iran by re-
engaging diplomatically (as many have already 
been doing), offering cooperation in terms of 
regional dialogue (e.g. on Syria, Al-Qaeda, etc.) 
and promising concrete support for the 
development of nuclear energy for civilian 
purposes. Closer commercial links can be 
beneficial in normalising relations, but member 
states must make it clear, to both Iran and their 
own citizens and companies, that no actual 
trade in sanctioned goods and services will take 
place as long as sanctions remain in force.  
 
 
